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Abstract
Justice is, in principle, a public affair. Publicity relates to the “fabrication ” o f 
justice as well as to the control o f the justice system. The principle o f publicity 
has undergone major changes: Expediency and the right to privacy have turned 
public hearings into a rare event. At the same time, mass media have “sensation­
alised" court cases, at least the spectacular ones. A ll this calls fo r a reappraisal 
o f the publicity principle which w ill cover somewhat different issues ranging from  
Court-TV up to “justice and rituals
I. Introduction
Our theme has been coined by Lord Hewart in a case concerning bias2 and has 
since turned into one o f the most prominent quotations on justice. Today, it may 
well pass as an indicator for justice tout court. It does indeed trigger o ff several 
strands o f thought, classical or modem, which lead us to the very essence o f jus­
tice and its role in society/ W ith an empirical touch, we could call it an essential 
socio-psychological prerequisite o f the administration o f justice. To become more 
concrete: The dictum reminds us that justice should not take place behind closed 
doors. Rather, justice is, in principle, a public affair.
In continental Europe the “reformierte Strafprozess” departed from the secret 
inquisitorial trial and endorsed the publicity principle. Evidently, court proce­
dures have undergone major changes since which tend to undermine the principle 
i f  not to do away w ith it. Nowadays “public”  is in this context almost synony­
mous w ith the “media” . Rehearsing the role o f mass media in regard o f the justice 
system we w ill inevitably be confronted with the question whether it is justified 
to exclude television and film  from court hearings.
Our dictum refers to yet another aspect o f justice, namely its presentation, its 
mise-en-scene. The “ fabrication” o f justice has always relied on vision and on 
hearing. This is not just a historical fact, but also a matter o f scholarly concern in 
our days. Ethnography and m icro-sociology have entered the courts and the 
court-rooms. Their discoveries may shed new light on the role o f judicia l cere­
monies and rituals. Here we can also draw from the rich mine o f research on ritu­
als, historical and otherwise.
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Hence Lord Hewart’s aphorism invites us to a very basic rehearsal o f proce­
dure. It ties together philosophical considerations and socio-psychological in­
sights. It calls for theoretical reflection and policy considerations as well. Such an 
ambitious program cannot be dealt with satisfactorily in a short paper. Still, allow 
me to present my albeit sketchy personal reading o f Lord Hewart’s statement.
II. Why procedure matters
Justice is a key issue in philosophical and political thought. It figures among the 
prime normative aspirations o f mankind. When speaking o f justice we operate at 
the conceptual level, in the world o f ideas so to speak. Yet, justice has an institu­
tional aspect as w ell which refers to the level o f agencies and actors. They are 
supposed to put across the idea o f justice in real life. Whatever concept o f justice 
we have,4 it needs to be implemented! By way o f implementation, justice be­
comes tangible. Despite all short-comings, the administration o f justice is the eve­
ryday approximation o f what justice is about. Though we may still cling to our 
dreams o f justice, we know that, for all practical purposes, this is it.
We have entrusted this practical test o f justice to the law and to the state. 
Hence we expect a good delivery. I resist the temptation to enter into the debate 
about the relationship between law and the state which would eventually lead us 
to the Kelsenean equation o f law and force or to Hobbes’ softer version o f “auc- 
toritas, non veritas facit legem” , both formulae insinuating that law has to be 
backed by power. Both contentions could be misunderstood in the sense that con­
tent does not matter. Instead, I suggest a socio-psychological approach which 
cares about content and about process.5 Particular attention must therefore be 
paid to the quality o f trials and processes since, in a way, they constitute a public 
forum to justify a verdict.6 Socio-psychological knowledge tends to back the tra­
ditional notion that at least the public’s feeling for justice being done depends on 
the acceptance o f the procedure just as well as on the just result. In consequence, 
procedural guarantees should not be conceived o f as brakes but rather as a pre­
requisite for justice.7 This is not just a theoretical notion, the US-American socio­
psychologist Tyler provides empirical support for the triad “Procedural Justice -  
Legitimacy -  Compliance” .8
In a way, our sub-title “Why process matters?”  needs to be specified: it is not 
just process that matters but a particular process, namely a fair process. O f course 
we can keep on arguing indefinitely about the standards o f fairness.7 Admittedly, 
agreeing in principle does not imply agreeing on a particular (high) standard. Yet, 
it is generally accepted that procedure w ill not allow shortcuts, it w ill rather be 
about built-in detours,10 call it “ schützende Formen” , due process or whatever. O f
66
“Justice must be seen to be done ”
course, in the contemporary security haunted climate this contention w ill not be 
overly popular on first sight. Yet, in the long run we cannot ignore Justice 
Brandeis statement: “I f  the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds con­
tempt for law; it invites every man to become a law onto himself; it invites anar­
chy.” 11
III. Publicity -  Ancient and Modern
Public trials have a long tradition. Our contemporary notion o f the principle o f 
publicity has, however, only been shaped in the era o f Enlightenment in reaction 
to the secret inquisitorial trial. Publicity is a must in the canon o f reform princi­
ples. No eminent German jurists o f this period could refrain from taking a stand. 
Feuerbach has come forward with an eloquent yet cautious defense o f the publici­
ty principle, cautious because this principle happened to be a French export arti­
cle. He starts out with allegorical reflections about light as a source, element and 
symbol o f good and darkness as the origin, production site and synonym o f evil.12 
Still, Feuerbach has his second thoughts concerning the control potential since the 
public at large w ill normally not dispose o f the necessary legal expertise. Only 
when the law has descended to the people, the control power w ill become real.'3 
Moreover, such a control is, according to Feuerbach, liable to infringe upon judi­
cial independence and the judges' freedom o f judgment.14 For him there is no 
room for a court o f public opinion (“ein Gericht der öffentlichen Meinung”). He 
nourishes a deeply rooted antipathy against what he calls the “Straßenjustiz” .13 
This said he still considers the public’s presence to be a constitutional right, since 
the constitution is at stake not only at the parliamentary level, but also at the level 
o f the courts.10
W ith his meandering line o f thought, Feuerbach does not sound overly con­
vinced o f the need for the presence o f the public. He takes his distance from those 
who consider the principle o f publicity as a panacea against all the flaws o f pro­
cedure.17 However, he senses the winds o f change: “Wer längere Zeit in den Hal­
len der öffentlichen Justiz gewohnt, mit ihr gelebt und sich befreundet hat, wird, 
... bald so sehr von ihrem Wesen durchdrungen, daß es ihn zuletzt Mühe kostet, 
auch nur die Vorstellung von dem möglichen Daseyn einer nicht öffentlichen Ge­
rechtigkeitspflege wieder zur Klarheit zu bringen.” 18 It seems to me that Feuer­
bach’s reservations are rather an expression o f political restraint. He is in favour 
o f change, yet he deems it inappropriate to give all the credit to the French and to 
advocate a wholesale takeover. Be this as it may: the era o f Enlightenment had 
transformed the principle o f publicity into an indicator o f political culture and o f 
the democratisation o f the court system. What, in medieval times, used to be -
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Justice must be seen to be done -  a prerequisite o f the functioning o f the legal 
system as such was now rather perceived o f as part o f the constitutional legitima­
tion o f the judicia l system.
In the end, the principle o f publicity carried the day. However, it was only ap­
plied to the hearing. O f course, its consecration in the German Constitution o f 
Courts Act in 1877 did not put an end to the debate. Revisiting the principle to­
day, we have to acknowledge major changes which call for its reappraisal. R ival­
ing interests, such as privacy, have become more prominent and, with the consol­
idation o f the judiciary, there is more room to pay respect to them. Also, the gen­
eral direction o f publicity has changed. Whereas, traditionally, the public used to 
be identified with individual visitors, mass media has nowadays largely taken 
over. This gives rise to a new set o f issues culminating in the question whether 
T V  should be allowed into the court room. Finally, the changes in the procedural 
set-up also call for a reappraisal o f the publicity principle. In Germany, hearings 
take place in only 20 % o f all indictable cases.19 Discharges under condition and 
written penal orders account for the rest. Moreover, plea bargaining practices tend 
to undermine the publicity principle even in the remaining cases o f public hear­
ings.
1. Publicity vs. privacy
The individuals who are involved w ill in the majority o f cases not like the public­
ity o f a crim inal trial. A s a matter o f fact, being on display w ill often be consid­
ered a punishment in itself. Publicity can have a stigmatising effect. In particular, 
spectacular trials may, due to the media coverage, have devastating effects for the 
accused and the victims irrespective o f the outcome.
We are heading for a complex balancing o f interest. On the one hand, trials 
can no longer take place behind closed doors. On the other hand, the respect for 
human dignity requires that the process should not be handled as a show yielding 
to base sensationalism. It is o f course d ifficu lt to draw the line. A  crim inal trial 
w ill inevitably expose the participants in public and to the public as long as we 
adhere to the principle that justice must be seen to be done. Yet, where is a bor­
derline which should not be transgressed? In particular, the protection o f vulnera­
ble witnesses may call for special precautions which range from the exclusion o f 
the public to the use o f “ surrogate evidence” , i.e. introducing into the hearing au­
dio-visual testimony gathered in the pre-trial phase. This transfer o f evidence 
from the pre-trial phase raises very principled questions regarding the structure o f 
the procedure, not necessarily regarding the publicity principle but rather regard­
ing the principle o f immediacy and the right to confront witnesses. Here, we
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stand at crossroads: I f we keep promoting and extending the possibility o f such 
transfers, the decision w ill only formally be taken at the end o f the hearing. In ac­
tual fact, it w ill be pre-fabricated during the preliminary investigation. This w ill 
not be without consequences for the defense. Also, more transparency w ill be 
needed during the phase o f the prelim inary investigation. Already Feuerbach had 
warned that the public hearing could not compensate for all the detriments o f a 
secret pre-trial phase.20
2. Publicity and the media
Mass media have come to be an omnipresent, almost irresistible power today. 
Today, mass media have more or less taken over as the main guarantor o f the 
publicity principle. It may therefore come as a surprise that some jurisdictions, 
among them Germany, still do not allow photographs or film s to be taken during 
the court session. Stubborn resistance or wise reluctance? This has been an issue 
in Germany for some time. A s a matter o f fact, this is already my fourth go at the 
topic. Revisiting my own positions o f 1986,21 200422 and 2006,23 it looks as i f  I 
had become more permissive each time. Has time come for me to endorse court 
T V  unconditionally?24
Let us rehearse the arguments. It is o f course d ifficu lt to explain why the me­
dia which have turned into the information and control agency should be barred 
with their perhaps most potent means o f expression from the court room. Also, 
the different fictional court-room shows which are running on German T V  con­
firm the great interest the general public takes in such matters. Moreover, should 
we really write o ff the educational potential o f an audio-visual presentation o f 
court sessions? And finally: it seems almost peculiar that we should rely on hear­
say when it comes to the mise-en-scene o f justice whereas audio-visual coverage 
o f other social events is more or less self-explanatory today. How w ill contempo­
rary court proceedings be accessible to future generations without any authentic 
audio-visual evidence? O f course, the counterarguments cannot be dismissed 
light-handedly. Serious detriments for the discovery o f the truth, sensationalism, 
loss o f rationality, a distorted picture o f justice, stigmatization are perhaps the key 
objections.
In Germany, the controversy has recently been fueled by the President o f the 
Federal Constitutional Court Voßkuhle who is inclined to open the hearings at his 
court to the cameras.2 " In turn, the President o f the Federal Supreme Court Tolks- 
dorf has argued in favor o f the status quo.26 This goes to show that the answer to 
our question w ill, to a certain extent, depend on the branch o f the judiciary we are 
talking about. A lso, this is a generation problem. The younger generation may not
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be afraid o f the potentially distorting effects o f the presence o f cameras, since it is 
more used to them. Transition periods may call for experimental designs, for a 
“policy o f gradualism” .27 The German Federal Constitutional Court already al­
lows cameras in when it is handing down its judgments. Parliamentary investiga­
tion committees may also allow  cameras to be present during their proceedings.
I fancy we could even include crim inal cases. In a first step we should open 
the court room for documentation purposes follow ing the French example. In 
France, which has adopted a rather restrictive approach with the so-called “ lo i 
Badinter” o f 1985, allow ing court sessions to be filmed only in cases o f historical 
interest,28 the authorities have tolerated (documentary) film s to be taken during 
the audience with the consent o f the persons involved. The most prominent pro­
duction, Depardon’s “ 10e chambre, instants d'audience”, was even presented at 
the Cannes Film  Festival in 2004. This film  gave me illum inating insights into the 
French proceedings. O f course, it is d ifficu lt to tell whether the recording pro­
duced tensions on the part o f the participants. I believe to have detected some 
overreactions, but rather on the part o f the professionals. But on the whole, this 
film  gave me the impression o f a straight-forward and discreet matter- of- fact 
production.
Though it may seem advisable to gain experience first with the more con­
trolled and controllable documentary approach before going further, the experi­
ences with court T V  in many other countries -  including Finland and Norway -  
show that an absolute prohibition o f court T V  is perhaps out o f step with the pre­
sent-day social reality o f a “Facebook-society” . The risk o f sensationalism exists 
w ith or without court TV.
3. The regression o f the public hearing
Public hearings have become a rare event and, i f  they take place, one cannot be 
sure that the decisive steps take place in public. A t least with procedures o f an in­
quisitorial type, this is not altogether new since such procedures have always re­
lied heavily on the more or less secret prelim inary investigation making the pub­
lic hearing sometime look like a mere ratification procedure. Certain tendencies 
give the impression that we are returning to the times o f a written or secret proce­
dure. O f course, prelim inary investigations do not take place without resonance. 
In spectacular cases, the prosecution, the defense and the victim  w ill express 
themselves in public,29 often enough with the intention to influence the ongoing 
procedure. Such moves may allow drawing some general inferences, yet they do 
not shed much light on specific procedural actions. To impose, in the inquisitorial 
tradition, a rigid regime o f secrecy for this phase o f the procedure like the French
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do (cf. Art. 11 Code de procedure penale), may be overstating the point. It is 
clear, though, that preliminary investigations should, normally, not take place in 
public. Too much publicity w ill hurt the proceedings at this stage. Yet, too much 
secrecy may also be counterproductive.30 The public has a right to be informed. It 
is customary that the police and the prosecution services provide information on 
ongoing investigations. Still, this is a delicate manoeuvre, since they w ill have to 
strike the balance between the presumption o f innocence and the access to infor­
mation. A s a general orientation we have to watch out that the prosecution au­
thorities do not get carried away by a “hunting spirit” . U.S.-American practices o f 
presenting suspects as a “trophy” in public -  see the recent Strauss-Kahn case 
which has given rise to a vivid and critical discussion o f the so-called “perp- 
walk”31 -  show, however, that the shield o f protection offered by the presumption 
o f innocence varies from country to country. Despite such differences, the “medi- 
alisation” o f the prelim inary investigation and its instrumentalisation for preven­
tive purposes is being practised all-over much to the detriment o f the procedural 
balance envisaged by the fairness principle.32
Though the prelim inary investigation is, at least in the more serious cases, 
threatened by too much publicity the large amount o f discharged cases tends to 
produce an enormous information gap, since the public w ill in these cases have 
no or little information on the reasons for such a disposal. O f course, the prosecu­
tion services and the judiciary would be overburdened i f  we expected them to jus­
tify each and every decision at length. Such means o f disposition have been in­
troduced to save time and resources. Yet, at least for the sake o f crim inal policy, a 
practice o f publication, in an anonymised form, o f representative cases should be 
developed. Such a practice would help promoting the predictability o f decision­
making and to counteract the impression that such decisions are being taken arbi­
trarily.33
The effectivity principle does not stop at the doors o f the court room. In con­
sequence, jurisdictions throughout the world have introduced or legalised regimes 
o f a negotiated justice. Internationally known under the name o f plea bargaining, 
such practices allow for an exchange between a m ilder punishment on the one 
hand and a more stream-lined procedure on the other. Their admissibility and po­
tential range are still a matter o f controversy.34
It is evident that plea bargaining raises many first principle questions o f pro­
cedure and o f crim inal law as such.33 Here, I shall restrict m yself to address the 
frictions with the publicity principle. Negotiations tend to take place outside the 
public hearing, in the judge’s chamber or on the phone. This could nourish dis­
trust in the judiciary, the raison d’etre for the publicity principle. It could give the
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impression that a privileged group o f defendants may take advantage o f this in­
formality. On this background, the German law requires that the “agreement” w ill 
have to be disclosed during the public hearing. Yet, such an ex post facto disclo­
sure could be discredited as mere tokenism. This said, we should, however, re­
member that the publicity principle does not require that every procedural step 
should be taken under the eyes o f the public. In a way, such practices may help 
promote the understanding that publicity is only an expression o f transparency as 
sort o f meta-principle.36 Transparency cannot only be achieved by publicity. For 
the sake o f transparency a well documented record o f the negotiation might suf­
fice as long as it w ill enable the public to check the fairness o f the bargaining 
proceedings.
IV. Rituals revisited37
Rituals have become a matter o f debate again, not only in the scientific communi­
ty, but also in public discourse. The revival o f rituals has made its way immedi­
ately into the justice debate which, only a generation ago, had concentrated on the 
deconstruction o f rituals. This holds true in particular for France. The first to take 
judicial rituals seriously again was Antoine Garapon who propagates a modern­
ised version o f rituals: “ II etait done faux de qualifier le rituel judiciaire 
d’archaique ... II faut repeupler la vie publique avec de nouveaux symboles, des 
rites efficaces, signifiants et maitrises.’” 8 Whereas Garapon is striving for “des 
symboles plus vrais”, i.e. for a certain dynamisation o f rituals, Desprez presents, 
some 25 years later, an almost nostalgic (re-)appraisal o f rituals. Fie considers 
them to be constituing elements o f “the majesty” o f the justice system. The legit­
imacy o f judges depended not only but also on rituals which transform rendering 
justice into a transcendental exercise.39 According to Desprez this comes to bear 
in particular in jury trials to which he consecrates the first part o f his thesis, 
whereas he diagnoses, in the second part, a constant “deritualisation” for the more 
“bureaucratic” types o f trial. This dichotomy is certainly overstating the point; 
this may be owed to the French tradition that every academic presentation should 
have two parts.
A  rationalist who nevertheless tends to be captured by rituals right away, a 
former judge fam iliar with the judicia l ornament who nevertheless tried to con­
vince by way o f argument, I am o f course tempted to engage into a lengthy ar­
gument. Yet my concern today is o f a more lim ited nature. I am not going to 
delve onto the reasons for this revival o f interest in rituals. Nor am I going to re­
hearse definitional issues. Such a rehearsal would in any event only confirm that 
the borderlines between ritual, rites, ceremony and symbols are blurry. Our slo-
72
“Justice must be seen to be done ”
gan “Justice must be seen to be done” suggests a functional approach: We are in­
vited to find out whether and to which extent rituals help to make justice visible.
Speaking o f judicia l rituals is a very general “ fa9on de parler” . The judicia l 
ritual is composed o f many elements ranging from gowns, a formalised exchange 
o f arguments within the particular setting o f a court-room to the “architecture par- 
lante” o f court buildings. Taken together this ensemble transforms justice into a 
performance which is distinct from everyday life, it creates a world o f its own, a 
detached micro- cosmos. The mise-en-scene attracts and focalises attention, it 
provides a certain demarcation from everyday life  and a structured set for a rather 
formalised interaction. The mise-en-scene orientates and mobilises a traditional 
pre-understanding: we realize immediately that this is a court session. Thus, ritu­
als underscore the institutional quality o f the process.
Let us face it: we cannot and should not dispense with this orientation function 
o f rituals. We should, however, beware o f excessive ritualisation which, as we 
know from Merton, is a synonym for stand-still.40 Too much rituality w ill give 
the impression that the courts operate as a self-perpetuating institution. A lso, ritu­
als are not sacrosanct, but liable to change. Interestingly enough, modem court 
architecture has taken up the theme o f visib ility which is certainly more appropri­
ate for a democratic society than the majestic orchestration o f traditional court 
buildings.41
V. Conclusion
The present-day reading o f the public/private dichotomy offers a complex pic­
ture. It seems to me that, in particular w ithin the younger generation, there is a 
wide-spread longing for public stardom or at least for public resonance fostered 
not only by television but also by modem internet communication habits and sys­
tems. In political life, the borderline between private and public has become blur­
ry anyway. Often enough, politicians w ill be tempted to instrumentalise their pri­
vate life for political purposes.
The justice systems seem to move into the opposite direction. Having “gone 
public” in the era o f Enlightenment much o f the administration o f contemporary 
justice takes place behind closed doors. Publicity has its price: Public hearings are 
costly and difficu lt to handle. Some o f the modifications o f the publicity principle 
have been introduced on purpose. Others have been the consequence o f structural 
changes. Revisiting the publicity principle is a timely exercise. We have to cope 
with divergent tendencies. More visib ility on the one hand, less visib ility on the 
other? Why not, if  the transparency o f the institution as a whole is guaranteed.
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It may w ell be that in the modem information society we no longer need the 
open door, since nothing w ill remain secret anyway, and that, correlatively, an 
increasing need is being felt for protection against too much publicity. Still, jus­
tice and publicity w ill remain inextricably linked. The experience in Columbia 
with “ invisible judges”42 shows that something is wrong with the administration 
o f justice i f  the judiciary operates in the dark.
Trials form part o f those mechanisms which help generate social cohesive­
ness. Such mechanisms depend on visibility. Otherwise, the lessons o f justice w ill 
not be learnt. Likewise, rituals w ill only string a chord if  they are orchestrated in 
front o f an audience. Sensual experience still matters when it comes to grasp the 
idea o f justice.
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